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Make Me Well-Liked: In re Grand Jury and the 
Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Public 
Relations Consultants in High Profile Criminal Cases 
Jonathan M. Linas* 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest recognized privilege for 
confidential communication.1 The rationale for the privilege is that it 
encourages openness and honesty between attorneys and their clients2 
because attorneys cannot reveal, or be forced to reveal, attorney-
client communications made for the purposes of seeking legal 
advice.3 However, the privilege often conflicts with the premise that 
in order for the adversarial system to work most efficiently, all 
applicable facts must be brought to light.4 While the privilege has 
often been extended beyond the traditional attorney-client 
 * J.D. (2005), Washington University School of Law. The author would like to thank 
Dr. Keith Linas for his constant assistance, Dr. Maura Linas for her love and support, and 
Professor Kathleen Brickey, who makes academic writing enjoyable and understandable. 
 1. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 
(John T. McNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore provides a brief history of the privilege:  
The history of this privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the privilege 
already appears as unquestioned. It is therefore the oldest of the privileges for 
confidential communications. Inasmuch as the testimony of witnesses (in the modern 
sense) did not come to be a common source of proof in jury trials until the early 1500’s 
. . . and as testimonial compulsion does not appear to have been generally authorized 
until the early part of Elizabeth’s reign . . ., it would seem that the privilege could 
hardly have come much earlier into existence, for there could have been but little 
material for its application. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that the “purpose 
[of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration 
of justice”). 
 3. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709–10 (1974) (“[G]enerally, an attorney . . . 
may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence. These and 
other interests are recognized in law by privileges against forced disclosure, established in the 
Constitution, by statute, or at common law.”). 
 4. See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
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relationship to cover communications with professionals who assist 
the lawyer in understanding the client’s needs,5 several recent 
decisions have extended the privilege well past traditional 
boundaries. These decisions allow for privileged communications 
between a public relations consultant, a client, and counsel.6  
In In re Grand Jury,7 the court held that in high profile criminal 
cases, communications between lawyers, clients, and public relations 
consultants hired by the lawyers to assist them in dealing with the 
media are protected by the attorney-client privilege when the 
communications are made for the purpose of giving or receiving 
advice directed at handling a client’s legal problem.8 Essentially, the 
court found that in situations where a persistent “drumbeat” against 
the target of the grand jury investigation is expressed in the media, a 
public relations firm can assist the lawyer and the client by quelling 
public reaction.9 The firm can thus affect the prosecutor’s willingness 
to bring charges or, if charges are brought, affect the severity of those 
charges.10 Although the court limited the holding to its particular 
facts, this Note considers whether the privilege is extended too far 
when applied to public relations consultants in high-profile criminal 
matters. 
Part I of this Note examines the historical rationale for the 
attorney-client privilege. Part II considers several cases in which 
courts have extended the privilege to professionals outside the 
attorney-client relationship and the rationales for doing so. Part III 
investigates prosecutorial discretion and the influence of public 
opinion on the charging decisions of prosecutors. Part IV examines 
the decision in In re Grand Jury and its inconsistency with precedent. 
It concludes that because the influence of public opinion on 
prosecutorial discretion is unsubstantiated and conjectural, extending 
 5. See infra notes 34–52 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand 
Jury Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re 
Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 7. 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 8. Id. at 330. 
 9. Id. at 323 (describing the nature of public relations firm’s strategy to influence 
criminal charges). 
 10. Id. at 330. 
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the privilege in In re Grand Jury was improper. Finally, Part V 
proposes a remedy for cases like In re Grand Jury by providing a test 
that courts should apply when deciding whether or not to so extend 
the privilege in the future. 
I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND ITS RATIONALE 
The attorney-client privilege keeps communications between 
attorneys and their clients confidential.11 In federal courts of the 
United States, the privilege is governed by common law principles as 
interpreted by the courts.12 As the oldest of the many common law 
principles applied in federal courts, the privilege has firm historical 
roots.13 But historical pedigree has not deterred courts from 
modifying the privilege throughout the years, as this Note later 
discusses.14  
As originally stated by Wigmore in his treatise on evidence, eight 
factors form the broad outline of the attorney-client privilege:  
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a 
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in 
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently 
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal 
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.15  
While seemingly basic and narrowly circumscribed, the issue of 
privilege arises more often and in a greater variety of situations than 
nearly any other issue in litigation.16  
 11. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292. 
 12. FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 provides that “the privilege of a witness . . . shall be 
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the 
United States in the light of reason and experience.” Id. 
 13. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542 (“[Attorney-client privilege] is therefore the 
oldest of the privileges for confidential communications.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing privilege between 
psychotherapist and patient); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (recognizing 
privilege between corporate employees and corporate counsel); United States v. Kovel, 296 
F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (recognizing privilege between law firm and accountant).  
 15. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554.  
 16. See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK 
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 1 (4th ed. 2001) (“Seemingly simple and straightforward, in application 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In order for an attorney to provide the most informed legal advice 
to a client, the attorney must understand the full contours and 
variations of the privilege—most importantly, to whom and in what 
context it extends.17 But to determine those contours and to examine 
the bounds of the privilege, it is necessary first to understand the 
underlying rationale for the privilege.  
The rationale that most often justifies the privilege is that it is 
necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice.18 Several 
theories articulate how the privilege serves this aim. One often-noted 
explanation is that an attorney can give well-informed legal advice 
only when information is given in confidence from client to 
attorney.19 Underlying this rationale is the notion that in the absence 
of all material facts, an attorney is incapable of exploring all potential 
legal avenues with a client.20 Thus, in order to make the client feel 
the attorney-client privilege arises in every imaginable situation with all possible permutations. 
Few issues arise with greater frequency . . . than whether a document is privileged from 
compelled disclosure by virtue of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 17. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 503[02], at 503-18 
(Supp. 1996) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE] (stating that “the benefit of the privilege is 
lost unless a fixed rule is applied that can be relied upon by lawyers and clients”). The problems 
associated with uncertainty in applying the privilege are explained further: 
If the privilege is to achieve its purpose of encouraging communications, the 
communicants must be able to discern at the stage of primary activity, whether the 
communication will be privileged. An ad hoc approach to privilege pursuant to a 
vague standard achieves the worst of possible worlds: harm in the particular case 
because information may be concealed; and a lack of compensating long-range benefit 
because persisting uncertainty about the availability of the privilege will discourage 
some communications. 
Id. at 503–19 (quoting Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control 
Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 426 (1970)). 
 18. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970) (“[M]aintenance of the attorney-
client privilege up to its proper limits has substantial importance to the administration of justice 
. . . .”); supra note 2. 
 19. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). Specifically, the Court stated:  
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client and 
attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of 
the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which 
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences 
or the apprehension of disclosure. 
Id.  
 20. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 4 (“Without access to all available and relevant facts, an 
attorney cannot give effective or reliable legal advice.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/19
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completely secure in expressing all material facts, communications 
must be privileged.21 Furthermore, a client who believes that the 
information provided to an attorney will be unprotected may decide 
not to retain counsel.22 Naturally, implementation of a policy 
discouraging clients from retaining counsel would undermine the 
adversarial system and prove detrimental to the administration of 
justice as a whole. 
Another policy rationale behind the privilege is that it results in 
increased voluntary compliance with regulatory laws.23 If clients are 
allowed to speak freely with attorneys in complete confidence, the 
attorney is better able to provide legal advice that will allow the 
clients to follow the law.24 Therefore, in order to ensure that clients 
respect and adhere to the laws, the privilege encourages full and frank 
disclosure. 
The maxim of strict construction, however, militates for a narrow 
protection of communications between attorneys and clients.25 The 
maxim provides that the attorney-client privilege should be narrowly 
construed because our justice system’s search for truth is limited by 
the facts available in each case.26 Naturally, any impediment to the 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Grand Jury Investigations, 401 F. Supp. 361, 369 (W.D. Pa. 
1975) (stating that “at the base of the attorney-client privilege lies the policy that one who seeks 
advice or aid from a lawyer should be completely free of any fear that his secrets will be 
uncovered”); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) 
(“To induce clients to make . . . communications, the privilege to prevent their later disclosure 
is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity.” (quoting MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 
210 cmt. a (1942))). 
 22. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358 (stating that “[i]n a society as 
complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws as complex and detailed as those 
imposed upon us, expert legal advice is essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest 
freedom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequisite” (quoting MODEL 
CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 210 cmt. a (1942))). 
 23. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 6 (explaining that “by promoting a client’s freedom of 
consultation with an attorney, the privilege fosters voluntary compliance with regulatory laws 
and thereby facilitates the effective administration of the laws”). 
 24. Id. (noting that “[t]he ultimate consequence of a reluctance to communicate freely 
with an attorney, it is feared, would be a diminished ability on the part of attorneys to advise 
clients as to what the law requires and would diminish the ability of attorneys to urge clients to 
follow the law”). 
 25. See United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(attorney-client privilege “should be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits”).  
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[E]xceptions to the 
demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are 
in derogation of the search for truth.”).  
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facts is an impediment to the truth and a harm to the administration of 
justice.27 Therefore, the maxim of strict construction is often cited to 
restrict use of the privilege except where it is essential.28 
Furthermore, adhering to the maxim of strict construction is 
important because the assumptions which justify the privilege are 
impossible to confirm, while the harm that the privilege causes is 
easily ascertainable. For this reason, even Wigmore, a “supporter of 
the privilege,”29 suggests limiting it to those situations in which it is 
wholly indispensable.30 Ultimately, courts must recognize that any 
privileging of communications will impede the discovery of truth.  
II. EXTENDING THE PRIVILEGE TO “AGENTS” OF THE CLIENT AND 
THE LAWYER 
A. Extending the Privilege to Professionals Other than Attorneys  
While Congress has never enacted a detailed explanation of the 
attorney-client privilege for use by the courts, Supreme Court 
 27. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 70. Specifically: 
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that 
the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence. When we come to examine the 
various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a 
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions 
which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive 
general rule . . . .  
Id. 
 28. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960). Specifically: 
As the underlying aim of judicial inquiry is ascertainable truth, everything rationally 
related to ascertaining the truth is presumptively admissible. Limitations are properly 
placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very limited extent that 
permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good 
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth. 
Id. 
 29. WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note 17, ¶ 503[02], at 503-17. 
 30. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554. Wigmore states: 
Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete. . . . It 
is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to 
the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest 
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.  
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/19
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Standard 503 contains a definition of the privilege on which courts 
regularly rely.31 Standard 503 provides a general statement of the 
privilege, allowing for protected communications between a client (or 
a client’s agent) and a lawyer (or a lawyer’s agent) that have been 
made for the purposes of obtaining legal advice.32 The rule provides 
an obtuse definition of what constitutes a “representative of the 
lawyer,” or, in other words, an agent of the lawyer: “A 
‘representative of the lawyer’ is one employed by the lawyer to assist 
in the rendition of professional legal services.”33 
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,34 the Supreme Court clarified 
Standard 503’s definition of agent by defining who constitutes an 
agent of the client.35 However, courts have struggled to define who 
 31. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 926 (8th Cir. 
1997) (Kopf, J., dissenting) (“Rule 503 accurately states the federal common law regarding the 
attorney-client privilege, as this court has consistently stated in the past.”); In re Feldberg, 862 
F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that Standard 503(d)(1) “captures well the common law 
of the crime/fraud exception”); Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1981) (“[C]ourts have continued to look to the proposed rules as a source for defining the 
federal common law of attorney-client privilege.”); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL ¶ 18.03[1], at 18-16 (1999) [hereinafter 
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL] (“Standard 503 remains a useful starting point in examining 
the use of the attorney-client privilege in the federal courts today. It is an accurate restatement 
of actual practice and is cited to frequently.”).  
 32. SUPREME COURT STANDARD 503(b) (1971), reprinted in WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, 
supra note 17, at 503–1. Supreme Court Standard 503(b) states that “[a] client has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose . . . confidential communications . . . between himself or his representative 
and his lawyer or his lawyer’s representative” that have been “made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client.” Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).  
 35. See generally id. In Upjohn, independent accountants discovered that a subsidiary of 
the Upjohn Company had made “payments to or for the benefit of foreign government officials 
in order to secure government business.” Id. at 386. In response to these concerns, the company 
decided to conduct an internal investigation to determine the validity and scope of the 
payments. Id. As part of the investigation, a questionnaire was sent to “All Foreign General and 
Area Managers” asking for information relating to the investigation. Id. at 386–87. The 
questionnaire informed managers of their ability to speak with their employees about the 
matter. Id. at 387. After the company voluntarily submitted a preliminary report disclosing 
certain questionable payments to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) launched an investigation to determine the tax consequences of those 
payments. Id. As part of the investigation, the IRS demanded that Upjohn disclose information 
discovered during its internal investigation. Id. at 387–88. Claiming protection under the 
attorney-client privilege, Upjohn declined to produce much of the information that the IRS 
demanded. Id. Thereafter, the United States filed a petition to enforce the action. Id. 
 The Court began its evaluation of the issue by stating that the privilege “rests on the need 
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constitutes an agent of the lawyer. Traditional staff of the lawyer, 
such as law clerks and secretaries, have been considered agents.36 But 
beyond the lawyer’s staff, who may qualify as a lawyer’s agent is not 
clear.37 The three most notable figures that courts have deemed 
agents of the lawyer are accountants, patent agents, and non-
testifying experts.38 
United States v. Kovel39 is the pre-eminent case granting attorney-
client privilege to accountants. In deciding whether to extend the 
privilege to an accountant hired by a law firm to provide tax advice,40 
for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking 
representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.” Id. at 389 (quoting Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). The Court continued by noting that in order for any 
legal problem to be resolved, all ascertainable facts must be collected by the advocate from the 
client. Id. at 390–91. In order for all relevant facts to be gathered, a lawyer must have access to 
anyone in a corporation who may possess information necessary to his cause. Id. at 391. 
Ultimately, the Court found that the employees of a corporation fall into this category. Id. at 
396. Thus, the communications that Upjohn employees had with counsel were privileged. Id. at 
397. Additionally, the Court spoke to the importance of clarifying the issues surrounding the 
privilege by noting that “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results 
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.” Id. at 393. 
 36. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2301, at 583. Wigmore states: 
It has never been questioned that the privilege protects communications to the 
attorney’s clerks and his other agents (including stenographers) for rendering his 
services. The assistance of these agents being indispensable to his work and the 
communications of the client being often necessarily committed to them by the 
attorney or by the client himself, the privilege must include all the persons who act as 
the attorney’s agents. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 37. WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 31, ¶ 18.03[2][c], at 18-19 (“Office 
personnel . . . are clearly considered representatives of the lawyer. More difficult is determining 
who else is ‘employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services.’”).  
 38. See WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note 17, ¶ 503(a)(3)[01].  
 39. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). In Kovel, an accountant, who was an employee of a tax 
law firm, was subpoenaed to provide testimony regarding a client of the firm. Id. at 919. The 
accountant refused to provide any information on the witness stand, claiming “that his status as 
an employee of a law firm automatically made all communications to him from clients 
privileged.” Id. at 920.  
 40. Id. at 919. The court began by noting the tension between drawing out all necessary 
facts in a given case and the need for confidentiality between a client and those from whom he 
seeks legal advice. Id. at 921. The court first noted that “[t]he investigation of truth and the 
enforcement of testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges.” 
Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 73). On the other hand, in contrast to the need 
to restrict the privilege, the court noted: 
[L]itigation can only be properly conducted by professional men, [and] it is absolutely 
necessary that a man . . . should have recourse to the assistance of professional 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/19
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the court reasoned that the “complexities of modern existence prevent 
attorneys from effectively handling clients’ affairs without the help of 
others.”41 The court likened the accountant’s relationship with the 
attorney to that of a translator hired to help counsel understand a 
foreign-speaking client.42 Ultimately, the Kovel court held that the 
privilege attached to the accountant.43 
Attorney-client privilege has also been extended to patent agents. 
While this is an issue that has divided federal courts,44 In re 
lawyers, and . . . it is equally necessary . . . that he should be able to place unrestricted 
and unbounded confidence in the professional agent, and that the communications he 
so makes to him should be kept secret . . . . 
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Bank, 2 Ch.D. 644, 649 (1876)). 
 41. Id. at 921. Additionally, the court found that the privilege could not be limited solely 
to “menial or ministerial employees” of the attorney. Id. The court considered “secretaries, file 
clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and aides of other 
sorts” to fit within this category. Id. The court reasoned that in cases where an attorney needs 
practical assistance, the information provided in meetings involving those assisting him should 
be kept confidential. Id.  
 42. Id. The court went on to point out four situations, using the translator analogy, under 
which it felt the privilege should apply: 
[First,] where the attorney sends a client speaking a foreign language to an interpreter 
to make a literal translation of the client’s story; a second where the attorney, himself 
having some little knowledge of the foreign tongue, has a more knowledgeable non-
lawyer employee in the room to help out; a third where someone to perform that same 
function has been brought along by the client; and a fourth where the attorney, 
ignorant of the foreign language, sends the client to a non-lawyer proficient in it, with 
instructions to interview the client on the attorney’s behalf and then render his own 
summary of the situation, perhaps drawing on his own knowledge in the process, so 
that the attorney can give the client proper legal advice. 
Id. 
 43. Id. at 922. The Kovel court recognized that “[w]hat is vital to the privilege is that the 
communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.” Id. at 922. 
Interestingly, the court was forced to draw a distinction between a case in which a client 
communicates first to his accountant and then consults his attorney on the same matter, and a 
case in which the client consults his attorney and the attorney brings in an accountant to review 
the matter. Id. The court found that the communications to the accountant would be privileged 
in the latter instance, but not in the former. Id. The underlying notion is that if the client spoke 
first to the accountant, it would not be for the purpose of receiving legal advice. Id. Responding 
to this seemingly-arbitrary distinction, the court stated that such distinctions are “the inevitable 
consequence of having to reconcile the absence of a privilege for accountants and the effective 
operation of the privilege of client and lawyer under conditions where the lawyer needs outside 
help.” Id. 
 44. Compare Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298, 304 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (extending the privilege to patent agents), and Vernitron Med. Prods., Inc. v. 
Baxter Labs., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324, 325 (D.N.J. 1975) (extending the privilege to 
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Ampicillan Antitrust Litigation45 provides a good example of the 
rationales used by courts that so extend the privilege. In determining 
whether the privilege applied to communications between a client 
and a patent agent,46 the court drew from the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Sperry v. Florida,47 and opined that there is little 
difference between a patent agent and a patent attorney in 
proceedings before the United States Patent Office.48 Thus, the 
Ampicillan court held that the patent agent should be given the same 
rights as an attorney regarding privileged information.49 
The final group to whom courts often extend the privilege is non-
testifying experts.50 However, even in cases where the courts are 
willing to extend the privilege to non-testifying experts, the privilege 
patent agents), with Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 155 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(stating that “no communications from patent agents, whether American or foreign, are subject 
to an attorney-client privilege in the United States” (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, 
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1169 (D.S.C. 1975))), and Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 
1, 5–6 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (finding no privilege for patent agents).  
 45. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978). Ampicillan involved an anti-trust suit. The plaintiffs in 
the case sought discovery of numerous documents that were “identified by the defendants . . . in 
their responses to interrogatories submitted by the plaintiffs.” Id. at 380. After a special court-
appointed master made recommendations regarding the documents, the defendants filed several 
objections to the recommendations. Id. at 380–81. The defendants contended inter alia that the 
master erred in “refusing to accord the [attorney-client] privilege to the communications 
[between a client and] a patent agent.” Id. at 381. 
 46. Id. The court began by noting the tension between the competing aims of the 
privilege. Id. at 384. The court found that its duty was to strike “a balance between the need for 
the disclosure of all relevant information and the need to encourage free and open discussion by 
clients in the course of legal representation.” Id. 
 47. 373 U.S. 379 (1963). 
 48. Ampicillan, 81 F.R.D. at 393. Specifically, the court in Ampicillan noted that 
“Congress, in creating the Patent Office, has expressly permitted both patent attorneys and 
patent agents to practice before that office . . . . Thus, in appearance and fact, the registered 
patent agent stands on the same footing as an attorney in proceedings before the Patent Office.” 
Id. The court also noted that “under the congressional scheme, a client may freely choose 
between a patent attorney and a registered patent agent for representation in [patent] 
proceedings.” Id. 
 49. Id. at 394. The court held that “where a client, in confidence, seeks legal advice from a 
registered patent agent who is authorized to represent that client . . . which thereby necessitates 
a full and free disclosure from the client to the legal representative so that the representation 
may be effective, the privilege will be available.” Id. 
 50. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (holding that federal law recognizes 
privilege protecting confidential communications between psychotherapist and patient); 
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note 17, ¶ 503(a)(3)[01]. 
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is limited to communications made to the attorney51 (as opposed to 
the knowledge of the client or the knowledge of the attorney obtained 
in situations other than confidential communications with the client). 
Thus, only the expert’s knowledge in relation to the client is 
privileged, not any other knowledge the expert may put forth.52  
B. Extending the Privilege to Public Relations Consultants 
The extension of the privilege to accountants, patent agents, and 
non-testifying experts often rests on arbitrary distinctions regarding 
the way that information is obtained from the client. However, the 
privilege in these areas is well-established and poses few problems 
for attorneys who wish to ensure that their communications with 
clients will be privileged.53 But courts have recently extended the 
privilege to public relations consultants, offering myriad rationales 
which are difficult to reconcile. While some clear trends have begun 
to emerge,54 the state of the law in this area presents difficulties for 
 51. See WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note 17, ¶ 503(a)(3)[01], at 503-36 to -38. 
Weinstein notes:  
Confusion exists in the cases [regarding experts] because courts have not always 
drawn the necessary distinctions. . . . A distinction must be drawn between an expert 
hired to testify at trial and an expert consulted as an adviser who will not testify. The 
first is a witness who . . . does not fall within the definition of representative of the 
lawyer. . . . 
 . . . . 
 In the case of the expert who is not a witness and who qualifies as a representative of 
the lawyer, a distinction must be drawn based on how his information is obtained. 
Id. at 503-36 to -37 (footnotes omitted). 
 52. Id. “Applied to the expert situation, this means that the expert’s observations, 
conclusions and information derived from sources other than the client’s communication 
constitute the expert’s knowledge, which, like the client’s knowledge and the attorney’s 
knowledge, is not privileged.” Id. at 503-37 to -38. However, “[i]f the expert-representative 
acquired knowledge from the lawyer, who in turn had obtained it from the client, then the 
privilege would apply.” Id. at 503-38. 
 53. See Thomas J. Molony, Note, Is the Supreme Court Ready To Recognize Another 
Privilege? An Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 247 (1998) (weighing the pros and cons of protecting 
communications between accountants and clients and illustrating the extent to which this 
privilege is established).  
 54. See Joseph F. Savage Jr. & Sarah Rimsky Levitin, Feeding the Beast While Protecting 
the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Public Relations Professional Privilege, 17 No. 11 White 
Collar Crime Rep. (West) 1 (2003) (pointing out some rules that may emerge from the three 
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attorneys who seek public relations help but wish to keep their 
communications with these firms privileged. 
In Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner,55 the court refused 
to extend the attorney-client privilege to communications between a 
client, his lawyer and a public relations consultant.56 The law firm 
had retained a public relations firm because of concern about the 
effect a lawsuit might have on Calvin Klein’s constituencies.57 But in 
the course of litigation, the court refused to extend attorney-client 
privilege to the public relations firm on three grounds.  
First, the court stated that, under Kovel,58 only documents that 
reveal confidential communications from a client for the purpose of 
seeking legal advice should receive the protection of the privilege.59 
None of the documents the court reviewed contained such 
communications.60 Second, even if the documents did contain some 
communications from the client for the purpose of seeking legal 
advice, the privilege would be waived upon their disclosure to the 
public relations firm,61 because the documents seemed to seek only 
“ordinary public relations advice.”62 Finally, the court noted that an 
cases discussed in this Note). 
 55. 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 56. Id. at 54. 
 57. Id. The law firm claimed to have hired the public relations firm in order to: 
[U]nderstand the possible reaction of [Calvin Klein’s] constituencies to the matters 
that would arise in the litigation, to provide legal advice to [Calvin Klein], and to 
assure that the media crisis that would ensue—including responses to requests by the 
media about the law suit and the overall dispute between the companies—would be 
handled responsibly . . . .  
Id. (internal quotations omitted). On the other hand, the defendant contended that the public 
relations firm had been hired to “wage a press war against the defendant.” Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). However, the court dismissed this rationale, noting: 
None of the[] vague and largely rhetorical contentions by the . . . parties is particularly 
helpful to assessing the purpose of the documents here in issue, many of which appear 
on their face to be routine suggestions from a public relations firm as to how to put the 
“spin” most favorable to [Calvin Klein] on successive developments in the ongoing 
litigation. 
Id. 
 58. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 59. Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 54. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. The court added that the public relations firm’s own “Account Activity Report” 
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extension of the privilege to the public relations firm would stand in 
contravention of the maxim of strict construction.63 Because the work 
performed by the public relations firm did not differ from what it 
would have been had the client hired the firm directly, extending the 
privilege was unnecessary.64 
On the other hand, some courts have been willing to extend the 
privilege to communications with public relations firms. In In re 
Copper Market Antitrust Litigation,65 defendant Sumitomo 
Corporation was a foreign entity unsophisticated in public relations.66 
None of Sumitomo’s corporate executives were proficient enough in 
English to conduct media relations.67 Thus, the firm hired a “crisis 
management” public relations firm in response to fears of litigation 
and an investigation by the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission.68 In considering whether to extend the attorney-client 
showed that the work they had been doing for the law firm “consisted of such activities as 
reviewing press coverage, making calls to various media to comment on developments in the 
litigation, and even ‘finding friendly reporters.’” Id. at 54–55. Whether such advice would be 
helpful to the law firm, the court noted, is immaterial if the information does not “enabl[e] 
counsel to understand aspects of the client’s own communications that could not otherwise be 
appreciated in the rendering of legal advice.” Id. at 55. 
 63. Id. The court stated that “it must not be forgotten that the attorney-client privilege, like 
all evidentiary privileges, stands in derogation of the search for truth so essential to the effective 
operation of any system of justice: therefore, the privilege must be narrowly construed.” Id. 
 64. Id. The court found that while some clients consider public relations to be absolutely 
necessary in modern trial advocacy, such necessity does not justify extending the privilege to a 
public relations firm. Id. The court stated that “[i]t may be that the modern client comes to court 
as prepared to massage the media as to persuade the judge; but nothing in the client’s 
communications for the former purpose constitutes the obtaining of legal advice or justifies a 
privileged status.” Id. 
 65. 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 66. Id. at 215. The court stated that the Sumitomo Corporation had “no prior experience in 
dealing with issues relating to publicity arising from high profile litigation, and . . . lacked 
experience in dealing with the Western media.” Id. 
 67. Id. “Only two of the three executives in Sumitomo’s Corporate Communications 
Department had English language facility and those individuals’ English language skills were 
not sufficiently sophisticated for media relations.” Id. 
 68. Id. Sumitomo feared that any statements made could become a liability during future 
litigation or investigation. Id. at 215–16. According to the court, “[t]he chief object of [the 
public relations firm’s] engagement was damage control, i.e., the management of press 
statements in the context of anticipated litigation to ensure that they do not themselves further 
damage the client.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The public relations firm assisted 
Sumitomo in preparation of talking points, press releases, and several other public relations-
related documents intended for several different audiences. Id. at 216. Many of the documents 
contained legal advice from Sumitomo’s law firm and in-house counsel. Id. Therefore, the court 
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privilege to the public relations firm,69 the court cited Upjohn Co. v. 
United States70 for the proposition that communications between the 
corporation’s counsel and a corporate client’s agents possessing the 
requisite information needed to give effective legal advice should be 
privileged.71 Next, the court found the public relations firm to be an 
agent of the Corporation.72 Reasoning by analogy, the court stated 
that as long as the public relations firm possessed information that 
counsel needed to render proper legal advice,73 communications 
between the firm and Sumitomo’s outside counsel should be 
protected.74 
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PUBLIC OPINION 
The American legal system provides prosecutors with broad 
discretion75 in determining “whether to investigate, grant immunity, 
found that the public relations firm “acted as Sumitomo’s agent and its spokesperson when 
dealing with the Western press on issues relating to the copper trading scandal.” Id. at 215.  
 69. Id. at 217. The court first looked to Supreme Court Standard 503. Id. The court noted 
that many courts have interpreted the Standard so as to “protect[] communications between 
lawyers and agents of a client where such communications are for the purpose of rendering 
legal advice.” Id. 
 70. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).  
 71. Copper Market, 200 F.R.D. at 218. The court listed the factors on which the Upjohn 
court based its holding:  
[T]he communications had been made to Upjohn’s counsel by its employees acting at 
the direction of their corporate superiors; that the information was needed to supply a 
basis for legal advice concerning potential litigation relating to the subject matter of 
the communications; that the communications concerned matters within the scope of 
the employees’ corporate duties; and that the employees were aware that the 
communications were for the purpose of rendering legal advice for the corporation. 
Id. 
 72. Id. at 219. Specifically, the court found that “for purposes of the attorney-client 
privilege, [the public relations firm] can fairly be equated with the Sumitomo for purposes of 
analyzing the availability of the attorney-client privilege to protect communications to which 
[the public relations firm] was a party concerning its scandal-related duties.” Id. 
 73. Id. The court found no distinction between employees that speak with counsel (as in 
the Upjohn case) and a consultant hired by the corporation that does the same. Id. The court 
stated that “[i]n applying the principles set forth in Upjohn, there is no reason to distinguish 
between a person on the corporation’s payroll and a consultant hired by the corporation if each 
acts for the corporation and possesses the information needed by attorneys in rendering legal 
advice.” Id. 
 74. Id.; see supra note 72. 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The Attorney 
General and United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal 
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or permit a plea bargain, and to determine whether to bring charges, 
what charges to bring, when to bring charges, and where to bring 
charges.”76 Generally, the rationale for providing prosecutors with 
such broad discretion is twofold: (1) The separation of powers 
doctrine suggests that prosecutors, as agents of the executive branch, 
are responsible for enforcement of the law,77 and (2) the factors 
which must be evaluated in deciding whether to prosecute are not 
well-suited for judicial review.78 However, while prosecutorial 
discretion is broad, it is not unlimited; prosecutors must establish 
probable cause,79 they are limited by constitutional constraints,80 and 
laws.” (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982))); Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to 
prosecute.” (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S at 380 n.11)); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 
114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are 
decisions that generally rest in prosecutor’s discretion.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a), at 10 (2d ed. 1999) (“The notion that the prosecuting attorney 
is vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when not to is 
firmly entrenched in American law.”). 
 76. Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1280–81 (2002) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 77. See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (noting that federal prosecutors “are designated 
by statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, and citing 28 
U.S.C. §§ 516, 547)); United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
prosecutor has broad power to indict because it is an exercise of executive power); United 
States v. Jones, 287 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2002) (decision to prosecute is “a proper exercise of 
executive discretion” (quoting United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 333 (5th Cir. 1998))). 
 78. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (“Such factors as the strength of the case, the 
prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s 
relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the 
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 
480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (holding that broad discretion is appropriate because the prosecutor, 
not the courts, must evaluate the strength of the case, allocation of resources, and enforcement 
priorities). 
 79. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (“In the ordinary case, ‘so long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision 
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.’” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))). 
 80. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (finding motive improper when it is “‘deliberately 
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification’” 
(quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364, and Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))); 
Bragan v. Poindexter, 249 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding prosecutorial discretion is not 
unfettered and government acts are unconstitutional if intended to penalize defendant for 
exercise of constitutional right); United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(holding defendant’s political activity cannot be motivation for criminal prosecution).  
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courts will question prosecutorial decisions not reached in good 
faith.81  
At the federal level, prosecutorial discretion is guided by the 
Department of Justice’s Attorney General’s Manual, the handbook 
for United States Attorneys throughout the country.82 In determining 
when a prosecutor should bring charges against a possible offender, 
the Manual provides little substantive guidance, stating that “[t]he 
attorney for the government should commence . . . Federal 
prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct constitutes a 
Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be 
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.”83 Thus, the Attorney 
General’s Manual advocates what might be called a reasonable 
likelihood of conviction standard for prosecutorial charging 
decisions. Recent scholarship suggests that this standard is a typical 
prosecutorial charging standard throughout the country.84 The reason 
for the popularity of such a standard is aptly summarized as follows: 
Given limited resources and full, if not burgeoning, caseloads, 
there is simply no practical and legitimate reason for a 
prosecutor to proceed to trial in a case that has no reasonable 
prospect of resulting in a conviction. Thus, as a purely tactical 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Los Santos, 283 F.3d 422, 428 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
in order to allow district court to grant downward departure based on prosecutorial delay, delay 
must have been in bad faith or unreasonable); United States v. Wolf, 270 F.3d 1188, 1190 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (holding court may review prosecutor’s refusal to file substantial-assistance 
downward-departure motion if prosecutor acted in bad faith); United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 
176 F.3d 1253, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the court can review government’s 
refusal to move for downward departure under Sentencing Guidelines if government acted in 
bad faith).  
 82. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-1.100 (1997) (“The 
United States Attorneys’ Manual is . . . designed as a quick and ready reference for United 
States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, and Department attorneys responsible for 
the prosecution of violations of federal law. It contains general policies and some procedures 
. . . .”). 
 83. Id. § 9-27.220. Additionally, the manual provides that prosecution should be declined 
if the prosecutor believes that “1. [n]o substantial Federal interest would be served by 
prosecution; 2. [t]he person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or 3. 
[t]here exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” Id.  
 84. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU 
L. REV. 669, 684 (1992) (“[V]irtually all prosecutors require, at least at the time of trial, that the 
government’s case present a reasonable likelihood of conviction.”). 
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matter, prosecutors will not proceed, to trial at least, with cases 
presenting no reasonable likelihood of conviction.85  
Beyond this evidentiary standard, there is nothing else a prosecutor 
must consider in making charging decisions. But, naturally, what a 
prosecutor does consider is not limited to what a prosecutor must 
consider.86 
Rather, scholarship suggests several other factors that may 
influence prosecutors’ charging decisions. Examples of 
considerations that prosecutors take into account include “the ethical 
appropriateness of their behavior,”87 “the fairness of their charging 
decisions” as a whole,88 the positions of defense counsel on a case,89 
the strength of police officers’ convictions about a case,90 a sense of 
loyalty to the victims of the crime,91 individual aspirations,92 and the 
influence of public opinion and attention.93 While each of these 
factors is likely influential to a prosecutor’s charging decision, no 
factor is dispositive. The relative weight afforded each factor is likely 
a function of two things: the character of the specific prosecutor’s 
office and the character of the individual prosecutor assigned to the 
case.94 Thus, with the exception of likelihood of conviction based on 
 85. Id. at 685. 
 86. Id. at 684. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 691 (“With the adoption of an adversary ethic, some prosecutors advocate 
extreme positions in an attempt to counterbalance the position of defense counsel. Some 
prosecutors also respond in kind to defense tactics, feeling that adversary combat cannot be 
fought with unequal weaponry.”) (footnote omitted). 
 90. Id. at 689 (“Prosecutors also come into prolonged and recurrent contact with police 
officers. As a result, prosecutors may tend to regard police officers as their clients. Thus, some 
prosecutors may be reluctant to derail prosecutions, particularly where the police officers feel 
strongly about the case.”) (footnote omitted). 
 91. Id. (“[P]rosecutors may come to know victims as real people, possibly likeable people, 
and very often persons deserving of consideration and sympathy. Quite naturally, prosecutors 
may develop loyalty to victims, and that loyalty may influence the prosecutors’ decisions.”). 
 92. Id. at 688 (“Some prosecutors have political or other ambitions, and consequently, 
they are concerned about their status and advancement within the prosecutors’ office. That 
advancement may often depend upon one’s image of being fearless about prosecuting difficult 
cases.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 93. Id. at 688 (“Particularly where cases generate public attention, the prosecutors’ office 
may be reluctant to appear ameliorative. In such cases, there is likely enhanced pressure upon 
the assigned [decision-maker] to obtain a conviction.”) (footnote omitted). 
 94. Id. at 687. 
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available evidence, the suggestion that any one of the competing 
factors is more influential to a prosecutor’s decision than another is 
nearly impossible to prove.95  
There are several reasons that prosecutors should seek uniformity 
in decision-making and avoid decisions based solely on variable and 
capricious reasons such as public opinion, political ambition, or 
personal animus. First, “[d]ecisions that reflect high moral values and 
impart a ‘minister of justice’ consideration inspire a heightened 
respect for our judicial system.”96 Naturally, as agents of the judicial 
system, prosecutors have a substantial interest in encouraging such 
respect. Conversely, “a widespread lack of uniformity with respect to 
discretionary decision-making by prosecutors reduces the public’s 
perception that the legal system employs a fair and ethical process.”97 
Finally, because of the highly detrimental consequences a criminal 
charge can bring upon a citizen,98 “the possibility of charging an 
innocent person [is] ‘the single most frightening aspect of the 
prosecutor’s job.’”99  
 95. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary 
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000). The article posits that “allegations of improper 
use of discretion premised upon racial bias are nearly impossible to prove.” Id. at 1518. Clearly, 
if bias based on a concrete factor such as race is nearly impossible to prove, it would be more 
difficult to prove the influence that an ephemeral factor, such as public opinion, would have on 
a prosecutor’s decision-making process. 
 96. Id. at 1514 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1999)). 
 97. Id. The article further explains that “[a] lack of uniformity is particularly problematic 
when it occurs through actions of prosecutors, who unlike judges do not have an exclusively 
neutral role in the criminal justice system.” Id. 
 98. Melilli, supra note 84, at 672. Specifically, the author notes:  
[T]he mere filing of a criminal charge can have a devastating effect upon an 
individual’s life, including potential pretrial incarceration, loss of employment, 
embarrassment and loss of reputation, the financial cost of a criminal defense, and the 
emotional stress and anxiety incident to awaiting a final disposition of the charges. 
Such consequences may well have a permanent effect that is not cured even by an 
acquittal at trial. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 99. Id. (quoting DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 13 
(1982)). 
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IV. EXTENDING THE PRIVILEGE TO PUBLIC RELATIONS 
CONSULTANTS IN HIGH PROFILE CRIMINAL MATTERS: THE CASE OF 
IN RE GRAND JURY 
A. In re Grand Jury  
In the case of In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 
Directed to (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury 
Witness,100 the court held that in high profile criminal matters, 
communications between the target (“Target”)101 of a grand jury 
investigation and a public relations firm hired by her lawyers were 
privileged.102 Target’s lawyers hired a public relations firm, claiming 
concern that unbalanced press reports in the media would create 
public sentiment that would be detrimental to Target’s interests.103 
The public relations firm’s goal was to provide a counterweight to the 
press reports so that prosecutors and regulators could make informed 
decisions about how to proceed against Target without added public 
pressure.104  
 100. 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 101. Throughout the opinion, the court referred to the grand jury target solely as “Target.” 
See, e.g., id. at 322. The court stated that “[i]n view of the importance of this issues [sic], this 
redacted version of the opinion, which substitutes pseudonyms for names and omits other 
identifying information, is being filed in the public records of the Court.” Id. (footnote omitted).  
 102. Id. at 332. Notably, the court held this regardless of whether the communications were 
made within or without the presence of her attorney: “The . . . issue is the question of Target’s 
communications with the consultants, some of which took place in the presence of the lawyers 
while others were strictly between Target and [the public relations] [f]irm. The Court is of the 
view that both types of communications are covered by the privilege . . . .” Id. at 331. 
 103. Id. at 323. The court quoted the record: “Target’s attorneys hired Firm out of a 
concern that unbalanced and often inaccurate press reports about Target created a clear risk that 
the prosecutors and regulators conducting the various investigations would feel public pressure 
to bring some kind of charge against her.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 104. Id. at 323–24. Specifically: 
Firm’s primary responsibility was defensive—to communicate with the media in a way 
that would help restore balance and accuracy to the press coverage. [The] objective . . . 
was to reduce the risk that prosecutors and regulators would feel pressure from the 
constant anti-Target drumbeat in the media to bring charges . . . [and thus] to 
neutralize the environment in a way that would enable prosecutors and regulators to 
make their decisions and exercise their discretion without undue influence from the 
negative press coverage.  
Id. at 323 (internal quotations omitted). However, the court noted that the “[f]irm’s activities 
were not limited to advising Target and her lawyers” and included other interaction with the 
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After some preliminary discussion about the attorney-client 
privilege,105 the court recited the rationale of United States v. 
Kovel,106 and affirmed the importance of Kovel to Target’s case.107 
The court found that, like the lawyer’s need for accounting help in 
Kovel, the lawyers in In re Grand Jury “need[ed] outside help,” 
which justified hiring the public relations firm.108 The court also 
noted that consultants used by lawyers to help in trial advocacy and 
preparation are often afforded the privilege.109  
Next, the court considered whether a lawyer’s effort to influence 
public opinion for the sake of neutralizing the environment around 
prosecutors and regulators could serve as a client service for which 
the privilege should be extended.110 The court stated that there is a 
modern trend to view the lawyers role vis-à-vis public opinion 
media. Id. at 324. Beyond advising, the “[f]irm spoke extensively to members of the media, in 
some instances to find out what they knew and, where possible, where the information came 
from. And it conveyed to members of the media information that the Target defense team 
wished to have disseminated.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 105. Id. at 324–26. First, the court set out the broad outline of the privilege. Id. at 324. The 
court noted that the privilege applies to (a) communications between the client and the lawyer, 
id. at 324, and that (b) the privilege has been extended to agents of the lawyer in certain 
instances, id. at 325. The court stated that “the privilege in appropriate circumstances extends to 
otherwise privileged communications that involve persons assisting the lawyer in the rendition 
of legal services.” Id.  
 106. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 107. In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326. 
 108. Id. (quoting Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922). The court stated: 
No one suggests that communications between Target and Firm would have been 
privileged if she simply had gone out and hired Firm as public relations counsel. On 
the other hand, there is no reason to question the stated rationale for her lawyers’ 
hiring of Firm . . . . [T]he Court accepts that this was a situation in which the lawyers 
. . . “need[ed] outside help,” as they presumably were not skilled at public relations.  
Id. (quoting Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922). However, the court distinguished the advice given in the 
case at bar from the technical advice given in Kovel. Id.  
 109. Id. The court noted: 
[C]onsultants engaged by lawyers to advise them on matters such as whether the state 
of public opinion in a community makes a change of venue desirable, whether jurors 
from particular backgrounds are likely to be disposed favorably to the client, how a 
client should behave while testifying in order to impress jurors favorably and other 
matters routinely the stuff of jury and personal communication consultants come 
within the attorney-client privilege, as they have a close nexus to the attorney’s role in 
advocating the client’s cause before a court or other decision-making body.  
Id. 
 110. Id. 
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broadly.111 In support of this proposition, the court cited Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada112 and 
recent scholarship,113 and noted that many courts award attorney’s 
fees for lawyers’ efforts to influence public opinion.114 Next, the 
 111. Id. at 326–27. Initially, the court noted that the lawyer’s role in the world of public 
opinion has historically been minor. Specifically: 
[T]he proper role of lawyers vis-à-vis public opinion has been viewed rather narrowly, 
perhaps primarily out of concern that extra-judicial statements might prejudice jury 
pools. Codes of professional conduct, for example, traditionally have limited the extent 
to which lawyers properly may seek to influence public opinion by proscribing many 
types of extra-judicial statements concerning pending litigation. 
Id. at 326. However, the court then discussed the modern trend toward a broader view of the 
lawyer’s role vis-à-vis public opinion. Id. at 326–27. 
 112. Id. at 327. In Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), a lawyer in Nevada held a press 
conference hours after his client had been indicted on criminal charges. Id. at 1033. Later, the 
criminal case was tried and the client was acquitted. Id. Thereafter, the Nevada State Bar filed 
suit against the lawyer alleging violation of a Nevada Supreme Court Rule that prohibited an 
attorney from making “an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be 
disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative 
proceeding.” Id. (quoting NEV. CT. R. 177(1)). The lawyer argued that he made the comments 
because “unless some of the weaknesses in the State’s case were made public, a potential jury 
venire would be poisoned by repetition in the press of information being released by the police 
and prosecutors.” Id. at 1042. Approving of the lawyer’s argument, the court stated: 
An attorney’s duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He or she cannot ignore 
the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may 
recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the adverse consequences of a 
possible loss after trial, so too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a 
client’s reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in 
the face of a prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper motives. A 
defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or 
reduction of charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public 
opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried. 
Id. at 1043. 
 113. See, e.g., Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schulman, When Talk is Not Cheap: 
Communications with the Media, the Government and Other Parties in High Profile White 
Collar Criminal Cases, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203 (2002) (discussing generally the practical 
considerations lawyers face when taking a high-profile criminal case); Jonathan M. Moses, 
Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1811 (1995) (arguing that legal norms should change with the times, allowing lawyers 
more freedom to influence public opinion). 
 114. In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 327; see also Moses, supra note 113, at 1848–49. 
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court distinguished115 Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner116 
and In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation.117  
The court found that Copper Market was distinguishable from the 
case before the court because “Copper [Market] disposed of the 
privilege issue by concluding that the public relations firm in 
substance was part of the client whereas Target [in the present case] 
makes no similar assertion.”118 In distinguishing Calvin Klein, the 
court found the present situation different because the public relations 
firm in Calvin Klein “had a relationship with the client that antedated 
the litigation, the client was a corporation addressing an array of 
constituencies including customers and shareholders, and the public 
relations firm . . . was ‘simply providing ordinary public relations 
advice.’”119 
Finally, turning to the issue of prosecutorial discretion,120 the court 
stated that prosecutors are influenced by public opinion when making 
charging decisions.121 Furthermore, advocacy in a public forum 
cannot “be conducted in disregard of its potential legal 
ramifications,”122 and dealing with the media is “not a matter for 
 115. In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 328.  
 116. 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 117. 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 118. In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
 119. Id. (quoting Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 54). 
 120. Id. at 330. Earlier in the decision, the court framed the major issue in the case in terms 
of prosecutorial discretion:  
The ultimate issue therefore resolves to whether attorney efforts to influence public 
opinion in order to advance the client’s legal position—in this case by neutralizing 
what the attorneys perceived as a climate of opinion pressing prosecutors and 
regulators to act in ways adverse to Target’s interests—are services, the rendition of 
which also should be facilitated by applying the privilege to relevant communications 
which have this as their object. 
Id. at 326. 
 121. Id. at 330. Specifically, the court stated: 
[I]t would be unreasonable to suppose that no prosecutor ever is influenced by an 
assessment of public opinion in deciding whether to bring criminal charges, as 
opposed to declining prosecution or leaving matters to civil enforcement proceedings, 
or in deciding what particular offenses to charge, decisions often of great consequence 
in this Sentencing Guidelines era.  
Id. 
 122. Id. The court noted that “[q]uestions such as whether the client should speak to the 
media at all, whether to do so directly or through representatives, whether and to what extent to 
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amateurs.”123 The court was persuaded that some of the most 
“fundamental client functions” would be impaired if lawyers were 
not able to frankly discuss client matters with their public relations 
consultants.124 Ultimately, the court held125 that communications 
between the lawyers, Target, and the public relations firm were 
protected by the privilege. 126 
B. Evaluating In re Grand Jury: An Improper Extension of the 
Privilege 
The following section examines the court’s problematic In re 
Grand Jury decision. First, the decision is inconsistent with 
precedent.127 Second, it is not in accord with the historical 
justifications for the attorney-client privilege.128 Finally, the court’s 
reliance on the power of public opinion over prosecutorial discretion 
to justify an extension of the privilege is improper.129 
1. In re Grand Jury is Inconsistent with Prior Precedent  
The In re Grand Jury decision is inconsistent with prior cases that 
have extended the attorney-client privilege beyond the confines of the 
comment on specific allegations, and a host of others can be decided without careful legal input 
only at the client’s extreme peril.” Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. The court listed some of these functions, such as “(a) advising the client of the 
legal risks of speaking publicly and of the likely legal impact of possible alternative 
expressions, (b) seeking to avoid or narrow charges brought against the client, and (c) zealously 
seeking acquittal or vindication.” Id. 
 125. Id. at 331. The Court held: 
(1) [C]onfidential communications (2) between lawyers and public relations 
consultants (3) hired by the lawyers to assist them in dealing with the media in cases 
such as this (4) that are made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice (5) directed 
at handling the client’s legal problems are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
Id. 
 126. After stating its general holding, the court considered whether Target’s 
communications, which took place outside the presence of her attorneys, would be protected by 
the privilege. Id. In response to this inquiry, the court cited Kovel and held that it would be mere 
formalism to hold that such conversations would not be protected “provided the purpose of the 
confidential communication was to obtain legal advice.” Id. 
 127. See infra notes 130–53 and accompanying text. 
 128. See infra notes 154–56 and accompanying text. 
 129. See infra notes 157–64 and accompanying text. 
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attorney-client relationship.130 First, it is inconsistent with United 
States v. Kovel,131 which extended the privilege to accountants. In 
Kovel, the assistance sought by the attorney was accounting advice.132 
Presumably, without this advice the attorney could not have 
understood completely the evidence before him and provided his 
client with the most effective legal advice. But In re Grand Jury is a 
different situation. The In re Grand Jury case did not primarily 
involve technical advice of the sort given to the Kovel attorney.133 
Furthermore, the public relations advice sought in In re Grand Jury 
assisted the attorney with matters that were only peripheral to the 
substantive merits of the case.134  
In re Grand Jury is also inconsistent with In re Ampicillan 
Antitrust Litigation,135 in which the privilege was extended to patent 
agents because of their similarities to patent attorneys.136 While 
lawyers may perform some public relations functions, the similarities 
between a lawyer and a public relations expert are hardly equivalent 
to those between a patent agent and a patent attorney. Application of 
the Ampicillan rule to In re Grand Jury is therefore inappropriate. 
Finally, the In re Grand Jury court intimated that the case at bar 
was not the same as those cases involving non-testifying experts.137 
But the court noted that the privilege had been extended to 
consultants used by lawyers to help in trial advocacy and 
preparation,138 implicitly suggesting that there is a strong similarity 
between public relations consultants and expert witnesses. Such 
analogy is mistaken. The difference between trial consultants and a 
public relations firm is that trial consultants are used to assist the 
lawyer with trial advocacy. The public relations firm, on the other 
hand, is used for pre-trial advocacy or to avoid trial at all.139 The rule 
 130. See supra notes 34–52 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 133. 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 134. See supra note 108. 
 135. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 137. In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 323–24; see also supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
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for non-testifying experts is too dissimilar to be applied in In re 
Grand Jury. 
In re Grand Jury is also difficult to reconcile with other cases that 
have extended the privilege to public relations consultants.140 In 
Calvin Klein, the court stated that whether advice from a public 
relations expert would be helpful to the law firm is immaterial if the 
information does not “enabl[e] counsel to understand aspects of the 
client’s own communications that could not otherwise be appreciated 
in the rendering of legal advice.”141 The In re Grand Jury court did 
not explain away this rationale. While the court found that the public 
relations firm assisted the lawyers in applying Target’s 
communications in the media,142 the court did not explain how the 
public relations firm helped the lawyers understand Target’s 
communications. Also, the court in Calvin Klein held that extending 
the privilege to public relations experts stands in contravention of the 
maxim of strict construction.143 The maxim applies with equal force 
in all cases in which the privilege is invoked,144 and thus the decision 
in In re Grand Jury also stands in contravention. Thus, the court’s 
attempt to distinguish itself from Calvin Klein is unconvincing.145  
 140. See supra notes 55–74 and accompanying text. 
 141. 198 F.R.D. at 55. 
 142. In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 324. 
 143. 198 F.R.D. at 55. 
 144. See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
 145. For a discussion of why the In re Grand Jury court distinguished Calvin Klein, see 
supra note 115 and accompanying text. The court’s rationale is unpersuasive for the following 
reasons. First, the court stated that the client in Calvin Klein had a relationship with the public 
relations firm that “antedated the litigation.” In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
Presumably, the suggestion is that if the client had a prior relationship with the public relations 
firm, then the work performed by the firm would be more like ordinary public relations work 
and less like legal work. This reasoning is unpersuasive. Working for the client in the past does 
not dictate that the present work will be any different.  
 Second, the court stated that in Calvin Klein, “the client was a corporation addressing an 
array of constituencies including customers and shareholders.” Id. But this fact would require 
an intricate knowledge of public relations, suggesting more of a need for public relations help 
than in In re Grand Jury. 
 Finally, the court claimed that the advice in Calvin Klein was “simply . . . ordinary public 
relations advice.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, the In re Grand Jury court never 
explained what comprises “ordinary public relations advice” and why the advice given by the 
public relations experts in the case at hand was not such advice. Thus, because the rationale of 
Calvin Klein applies with equal force to In re Grand Jury, and because the reasons given for 
distinguishing the two cases are unconvincing, the In re Grand Jury court should not have 
departed from the holding of Calvin Klein. 
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In re Grand Jury is also inconsistent with Copper Market,146 
which extended the attorney-client privilege to a public relations 
firm. While the two cases initially appear to be quite similar,147 
digging deeper reveals crucial differences. In Copper Market, the 
court considered the public relations firm to be incorporated into the 
staff of the Sumitomo Corporation.148 But the In re Grand Jury public 
relations firm was not considered to be incorporated into Target’s 
staff. Additionally, Sumitomo was a foreign corporation that was 
highly unsophisticated regarding the Western press and had no 
executives with English skills sufficient for media relations.149 Hence, 
Sumitomo needed the public relations firm not only to serve as a 
translator to the press, but simply to deal with the press at all. In In re 
Grand Jury, there was no suggestion that the lawyers would not have 
been able to deal with the press without the assistance of the public 
relations firm. Rather, the firm was needed only because the lawyers 
wanted to deal with the press in a more skillful manner.150  
As the previous paragraphs discuss, In re Grand Jury is difficult 
to reconcile with precedent. The case adds confusion to an area of 
law where certainty is needed.151 In evaluating the case, one cannot 
help but recall the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Upjohn Co. v. 
United States152 regarding the value of an uncertain privilege. The 
court warned that “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to 
be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is 
little better than no privilege at all.”153  
 146. 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 65–74 
and accompanying text. 
 147. For instance, both Target’s lawyers and the Sumitomo Corporation hired the public 
relations experts because they feared that any statements they might make could be a liability 
regarding future legal positions. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 148. Copper Market, 200 F.R.D. at 219. 
 149. Id. at 215. 
 150. In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 323–24. 
 151. See supra note 17 and accompanying text 
 152. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).  
 153. Id. at 393. 
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2. In re Grand Jury is Not in Accord with the Historical 
Justifications for the Attorney-Client Privilege 
In re Grand Jury’s discrepancy with precedent is only one of its 
drawbacks. The case also does little to further those rationales that 
traditionally have justified the privilege.154 The most common 
rationale for the privilege has two aspects: (a) the privilege eases 
clients’ fears of disclosing material information and (b) an attorney 
can give well-informed legal advice only when all material 
information is disclosed.155 The extension of the privilege to a public 
relations firm does nothing to encourage a client’s frank disclosure of 
material information to his attorney. While it may encourage 
forthright disclosure from the client to the public relations firm, there 
is no reason that all material facts would not be brought out in the 
absence of the firm.  
The privilege is also justified on the ground that by allowing free 
consultation between client and attorney, a client is more likely to 
voluntarily comply with regulatory laws.156 Again, because the 
extension of the privilege to a public relations firm does not 
encourage the client to open up to his attorney, the attorney is in no 
better position to advise his client than he would be without such an 
extension.  
3. In re Grand Jury Places Improper Emphasis on the Power of 
Public Opinion over Prosecutional Discretion 
The In re Grand Jury decision is also problematic because the 
court partially rests its holding on the influence that public opinion 
has on prosecutorial discretion.157 This rationale is unsubstantiated, 
speculative, and hardly a valid reason to extend the privilege to 
public relations experts. 
The In re Grand Jury court was correct in recognizing the broad 
discretion that prosecutors have regarding criminal defendants.158 
 154. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 157. 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
 158. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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However, this expansive discretion is constrained by legal, 
institutional, and ethical considerations. First, prosecutors are limited 
legally by the requirements that they establish probable cause,159 that 
they do not prosecute selectively,160 and that they make charging 
decisions in good faith.161 Second, they are inhibited institutionally 
by limited resources and full caseloads, which lower the probability 
that they will proceed with a case if there is not a substantial 
likelihood of conviction.162 Third, they are constrained by ethical 
considerations, such as a realization of the serious consequences of a 
criminal charge to a citizen.163 Finally, prosecutors are motivated to 
inspire a heightened respect for their profession by avoiding charging 
decisions that appear to be based on arbitrary considerations, that are 
inconsistent, or that appear unethical or unfair.164  
Even in light of these constraints, certainly some prosecutors will 
make charging decisions based on variable and capricious reasons 
such as political ambition or personal animus. Some will even be 
influenced by public opinion. However, public opinion is but one of a 
myriad of reasons why a prosecutor may charge a particular 
defendant.165 No evidence shows that public opinion holds a place 
any higher or lower in importance to prosecutors than, for example, 
the strength of a police officer’s convictions about a case or a sense 
of loyalty to the victims of the crime. If a prosecutor has probable 
cause and there is a substantial likelihood of conviction in the case, 
nothing makes it illegal for a prosecutor to consider the tone of public 
sentiment when deciding whether to bring charges. However, such 
consideration will only be part of a many-factored analysis.  
In summary, prosecutors have broad discretion to bring criminal 
charges. Alongside legal, institutional, and ethical constraints, there 
are innumerable factors that influence charging decisions. While it 
may be true that one such factor is negative public opinion about a 
potential defendant, there is no convincing proof that it is a more 
 159. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
 162. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text. 
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dominating factor than other substantial concerns. Thus, public 
opinion should not be regarded as worthy of hindering the 
administration of justice by suppressing facts that may be crucial to 
the search for truth. 
V. PROPOSAL 
As Part IV of this Note suggests, the extension of the attorney-
client privilege to public relations experts, using the rationale set 
forth in In re Grand Jury, is improper. The case is difficult to 
reconcile with precedent and rests on an unsubstantiated 
presupposition regarding the influence of public opinion on 
prosecutorial discretion. Ultimately, the case may open the door to a 
jurisprudence in which the privilege will be extended to outside 
practitioners for any number of “modern” client services.  
Courts should only extend the attorney-client privilege in cases 
that present the most compelling need. Thus, when a court must 
decide whether to extend the privilege to practitioners other than 
those traditionally allowed the privilege, they should follow a two-
step inquiry: (1) whether the extension of the privilege in the present 
situation is easily reconcilable with precedent, and (2) whether the 
rationale used to justify the extension is so far beyond mere 
supposition that not extending it would inherently prejudice the 
proper administration of justice. Following this framework would 
avoid uncertain application of the privilege and prevent the 
suppression of facts that may be necessary in the search for truth.  
Under this proposal, there may still be situations in which the 
extension of the privilege to public relations experts would be proper. 
For instance, the extension of the privilege in cases like Copper 
Market166 might pass muster. In that case, the function of the public 
relations firm was quite similar to that of a translator for the 
corporation, a practitioner traditionally extended the privilege by the 
courts. Furthermore, that the company needed a public relations firm 
because they had no understanding of the Western media and no 
employees with English skills sufficient to speak with the media is 
 166. 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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far beyond mere supposition. Thus, the extension of the privilege in 
Copper Market fits nicely within the framework articulated above.  
Finally, what is most important in any decision is that courts 
remain mindful of the problems that an uncertain privilege presents; 
attorneys and clients only benefit from the privilege when they are 
sure that its application will be respected by the court. Great 
injustices can occur when information that a party believes will be 
privileged is deemed not to be in a later proceeding. If courts are fully 
aware of the damage caused by an uncertain privilege, the chance of 
such injustices occurring is minimal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The attorney-client privilege is a valuable part of the American 
legal system. While the situations in which it arises are as variable as 
the cases that come before our courts, its function remains constant: it 
helps ensure, through the free and frank disclosure of ideas between 
attorneys and clients, the proper administration of the justice 
system.167 However, when attorneys and clients are uncertain whether 
their communications will be privileged in later proceedings, the 
benefits of the privilege vanish.  
In In re Grand Jury, the court’s decision to extend the attorney-
client privilege to public relations consultants creates just such 
uncertainty. To remedy the problem the case presents, courts 
throughout the country should only extend the privilege in cases 
easily reconcilable with precedent and justified by a substantiated 
rationale. Only when courts are fully aware of the damage caused by 
an uncertain privilege will they establish a jurisprudence that 
properly ensures the beneficial effects of the privilege. 
 167. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/19
